Sociology of Serbia's Nuclear Revival: Society, Institutions, Governance. Part 2. Institutional-Management Architecture and Stakeholders' Behavioral Models in the Development of Nuclear Energy.

Part 2 (Hidden Threats) "Institutional-Management Architecture and Behavioral Models of Stakeholders in the Development of Nuclear Energy" shifts the focus to the state apparatus, exposing the fatal dangers of bureaucratic fragmentation, loss of competencies by officials, and institutional sabotage, which destroy nuclear megaprojects more often than any street protests.
Key theses:
•    The fundamental danger to the development of the national nuclear program does not come from street protests, but from institutional incompetence, interagency fragmentation ("bunker effect") and administrative paralysis of the state apparatus.
•    The political elite tend toward "symbolic technocracy" and avoidance of responsibility; supervisory bodies demonstrate a paralyzing aversion to risks, and local administrations shift to transactional opportunism. These factors lead to systemic hold-up of investors (Hold-up problem) and catastrophic construction delays.
•    The successful launch of the program requires the depoliticization of the Organization for the Implementation of the Nuclear Program (NEPIO) being established, guarantees of the regulator's cognitive independence, and the implementation of the strictest anti-corruption barriers at all stages of vendor contracting.